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Abstract: Information provided at the moment a person makes a decision can influence behavior 
in predictable ways. The United Kingdom’s Behavioural Insights Team have used this idea to help 
improve the insulation of lofts, collect taxes, and even reduce litter. The authors of this article 
developed software that appends a personalized message to each assignment in the class regarding 
the student’s current grade. This “grade nudge” explains precisely how the assignment will impact 
the student’s final grade given their current standing in the class. Through a randomized trial, the 
authors show that the nudge improves student homework performance by about four percentage 
points. 
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 “What’s my current grade?” 
 Student, after class, near the end of the semester  
Despite the proliferation of learning management systems (LMS), it is common for college 
instructors to hear questions about grade status. Usually, these well-meaning students have not 
concerned themselves with their grade up to this point in the semester, or they may not realize that 
their grade is available online. This concerns the authors for two reasons. First, in large classes this 
results in a negative externality endured by students who have content questions. Second, by the 
time this question is asked it is often too late in the semester for the student to substantially improve 
their grade. 
Students often think they can “make up” for poor performance early in the semester 
through additional work near the end of the semester. This is problematic because it is often 
mathematically impossible to overcome the grade impact of missed assignments or previous poor 
scores. Additionally, in many classes the content builds from one topic to another. Poor 
performance early on could lead to worse performance later even with additional effort by the 
student. 
We address the above problems by providing grade outcomes with each assignment. In 
principle, our solution should reduce the likelihood that the student is uninformed of their grade 
and “nudge” the students into better behavior early in the semester. In this article, we will show 
that our nudge improves student performance and is anecdotally liked by the students. 
We have implemented our nudge with a Google App Script written by the authors. Any 
instructor can use our software for free to send the following message with each assignment in a 
course: 
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Hi [Name], 
As of now, you have a(n) [Grade] in the class. This assignment is worth [Points] points. If 
you get more than [X] on this assignment, your class grade will increase to a(n) [Higher 
Grade]. If you get less than [Y] on this assignment, your grade will drop at least one grade. 
Not doing the assignment will result in a(n) [Lower Grade]. 
Here, [Name] is the student’s name, [Grade] is the student’s current grade, [Points] is the 
number of points the assignment is worth, [X] is the minimum number of points necessary to raise 
a student’s grade, [Higher Grade] is a grade higher than the student’s current grade and [Y] is the 
maximum points the student could receive and still drop a grade. [Lower Grade] is the updated 
grade of the student assuming they choose not to do the assignment.1 
The message can be delivered to the student in two different ways. If the homework 
assignment is a document, the message will be appended to the bottom of the assignment. The 
instructor can choose to share the document within the Google Drive environment or have a PDF 
sent by e-mail. Alternatively, if the instructor uses an online homework system, the grade nudge 
can be e-mailed separately from the assignment to each student. The software and instructions can 
be found online at https://bensresearch.com/nudge/. 
SOME USES AND RESEARCH ON NUDGES 
The concept of a nudge, popularized by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), often centers around providing 
information at the exact moment that an agent makes a decision. Past successes include informing 
tax evaders that most people pay their taxes (Lawton 2013), as well as increasing exercise through 
marketing techniques (Cohen et al. 2013). Perhaps most famously, the United Kingdom set up the 
Behavioural Insights Team in 2010 (BIT—often referred to as the “Nudge Unit”). The United 
States followed suit in 2014 with the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team (SBST). 
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This selective transparency of information is an application of bounded rationality. Due to 
the low cost of heuristics, Kahneman (2003) shows that relatively small barriers to information 
result in decisions that are based on intuitive thinking. The costlier the information is to acquire, 
the more likely it becomes that a heuristic will be used. This tendency to account for only some of 
the available information can result in socially suboptimal behavior. For instance, Bettinger et al. 
(2012) found that the complexity of the financial aid application process could lead some otherwise 
qualified students to forgo college; Bettman, Payne, and Staelin (1986) found that warning label 
design could change the consumer’s perception of risk. 
Using this basic insight from behavioral economics, the BIT and SBST have altered 
behavior by providing information in less costly ways. As an example, the BIT provides potential 
job market applicants information on recruiting events via text message (BIT 2015, 9–10). This 
has resulted in an improvement in recruitment event attendance. A similar program addresses the 
problem of missed hospital appointments by sending a reminder text message to the patient 
(Hallsworth et al. 2015). To improve university attendance, the BIT has encouraged more students 
to go to college by discussing the lifestyle benefits of higher education (BIT 2015, 26–27). 
While the SBST has not existed for as long as the BIT, their first year was marked with a 
number of successes sending information nudges by short message service (SMS) or e-mail. For 
instance, sending text messages to low-income students has resulted in an increase in college 
matriculation (SBST 2015, 33). Another project improved student loan borrower behavior by e-
mail notification (SBST 2015, 34). Finally, a single well-crafted and well-timed e-mail to military 
service members almost doubled the enrollment rate of a savings program (SBST 2015, 31). 
Previous research has shown that information nudges can be an effective tool to improving 
education outcomes. Kraft and Dougherty (2013) and Kraft and Rogers (2015) show that frequent 
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communication from K–12 teachers to parents results in a reduction in undesirable student 
outcomes. Further, Rogers et al. (2017) found that a single postcard home improved K–12 
attendance. At the collegiate level, Castleman and Page (2016) suggest that text messages 
encouraging students to file their financial aid forms results in higher rates of continuous 
enrollment.  This article builds on existing literature by showing that timely grade information can 
result in higher homework scores. 
RANDOMIZED TRIAL 
To test the grade nudge treatment, we ran a randomized trial on a total of two sections of 
“Economics of Sports in America” (hereinafter “Sports Econ”) and one section of “Fundamentals 
of Microeconomics" (hereinafter “Microeconomics”). Both courses are offered at a large 
geographically isolated research 1 institution: Washington State University (WSU). WSU is in a 
traditional college town where the student body accounts for 70 percent of the total population. 
The nearest major city is 75 miles away. In addition to programs offered on its main campus, WSU 
offers extensive online programs. 
Other than being online, both Microeconomics and Sports Econ are very similar to 
traditional on-campus courses, and involve a mixture of exams and electronically graded 
homework. Further, both classes exhibit a traditional grade distribution and have normal expected 
grades. Over the past three semesters, the median Microeconomics student has received a B+; the 
average Sports Econ student can expect a C+. Nonetheless, both classes exhibit the full spectrum 
of grades: many students will receive As and some students will fail. 
Both Microeconomics and Sports Econ are offered as an online undergraduate class every 
fall semester. Additionally, the two sections of Sports Econ were taught by the same instructor 
using similar online homework assignments graded on the computer using identical rubrics. Due 
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to the similarity across terms and consistent grading, this is a particularly attractive class in which 
to run this experiment. Similarly, Microeconomics used computer-graded homework assignments 
throughout the term. However, this class was taught by a different instructor than the two Sports 
Econ sections. 
The ideal way to implement a grade nudge is to append the treatment to the bottom of each 
assignment. With the treatment appended to the homework, the instructor is guaranteed that the 
student will see the grade outcome information if they look at the assignment at all. Unfortunately, 
assignments in all three sections were assigned through an LMS, and cannot be appended to by 
the Google App. Thus, our trial makes use of the e-mail notification method. 
An additional requirement of a proper test of the treatment is the ability to form two 
randomly created groups of students on each assignment: those who received the grade nudge and 
those who did not. Ideally, the students in the two groups would not communicate with each other 
and would have a high likelihood of seeing the treatment (sent over e-mail). Because online 
students rarely live near the main campus, they do not form intimate study groups and by necessity 
communicate with the instructor and classmates through e-mail. Online sections are therefore 
perfect for our experiment. 
For the fall 2014 (Sports Econ), fall 2015 (Sports Econ) and fall 2016 (Microeconomics) 
semesters, the instructors used the nudge software in a randomized setting. Homework in each 
class was deployed within the learning management system (LMS). 
In each of the three sections, the instructors used the nudge software to perform a 
randomized trial once there was at least one score in the gradebook to ensure that each student had 
an established grade in the class. With each assignment that followed, students would receive an 
e-mail indicating that the homework would soon be due. With 50 percent probability, the student 
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also would receive the grade nudge message (copied at the beginning of this article) at the bottom 
of the e-mail (regardless of whether or not the student had received a nudge in the past). This setup 
allowed for an experiment that was both ethically and statistically valid. 
We could have initially randomly assigned each student to the control or treatment group 
and used the same group assignments throughout the semester. This was ethically concerning to 
us and could possibly raise concerns with the Institutional Review Board. Based on the past 
successes of public policy information nudges, we suspected the treatment would have some 
positive impact on student behavior. Therefore, if the groups were consistently assigned, we could 
be potentially responsible for the control group receiving a marginally lower grade. Further, given 
that the control and treatment groups are randomly formed on every assignment, it is less likely 
that our results are spurious in the unlikely event that the treatment and control groups have 
different characteristics. 
Using the randomly assigned treatments and final homework scores, we constructed a dataset 
containing four elements: did the student receive a grade nudge on this assignment (0 or 1), percent 
homework score ([0–1]), student identifier and homework identifier. Therefore, we have five to 
seven observations per student in each of the three sections. 
 
TABLE 1: Summary Statistics 
 Nudge (Treatment) Assignment Score 
Online Sports Econ – Fall 2014 (204 Obs.)   
Mean 0.446 0.789 
Standard deviation 0.498 0.289 
Online Sports Econ – Fall 2015 (110 Obs.)   
Mean 0.400 0.744 
Standard deviation 0.492 0.371 
Online Microeconomics – Fall 2016 (462 Obs.)   
Mean 0.502 0.710 
Standard deviation 0.501 0.292 
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Table 1 shows the summary statistics for each of the three sections. Not surprisingly, a 
little less than half of the assignment/student pairs received a nudge and the assignment scores are 
relatively close to each other. We would note two anomalies with our data. First, the nudge 
procedure started earlier in the fall 2015 semester than in the fall 2014 sequences—some of the 
differences in effect size can probably be attributed to this difference. Second, due to logistical 
issues with late enrollments (and associated makeup assignments) in the first two weeks of class 
along with a misapplication of the treatment, the first nudge in our fall 2016 dataset is not the first 
treatment received by the students—however, it is unclear who was treated during the two weeks 
prior. Nonetheless, we have seven captured assignments from the class with which to run our 
analysis. 
Utilizing the collected data, we propose the following econometric model for our analysis: 
 𝑠"# = 𝛽& + 𝛽(Nudge"# + 𝜇" + 𝛾# + 𝜀"# (1) 
where 𝑠"#  is the score individual 𝑖  received on homework 𝑗, 𝜇"  represents the individual fixed 
effects and 𝛾#  the assignment fixed effects. Nudge"#  takes the value one if student 𝑖 received a 
nudge message on homework 𝑗, zero otherwise. For our purposes, when models contain multiple 
sections, we create assignment fixed effects for each section/assignment combination. While some 
assignments are identical in the Sports Econ sections, the material may have been taught 
differently. Therefore, we do not think we can rely on a single fixed effect for each assignment. 
Just like when we analyze a single class (or section), we drop only a single fixed effect of each 
type. Therefore, the control variables capture the differences between the classes. This is 
functionally equivalent to having separate baseline terms (𝛽&) for each class and dropping variables 
for each class—both methods produce identical results for 𝛽(. 
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We have applied a fixed effects approach as a random effects approach is inconsistent. One 
of the primary characteristics of a good student is that they have good metacognition (Coutinho 
2008). This results in reduced homework assignment performance variance. As there is less of an 
opportunity for the best students to be influenced by outside factors, the individual specific effects 
are negatively correlated with the independent variables. Our identification strategy assumes the 
treatment is strictly exogenous. A fixed effects model assumes the regressor is not correlated to 
the disturbance. If the effect of a nudge persists beyond the treatment period, this assumption may 
not hold. Partially for this reason, we examine the first nudge in a separate specification. 
 
TABLE 2: Estimated Impact of Nudge Treatment – Individual and Assignment Fixed Effects 
 
Sports 
Fall 2014 Sports Fall 2015 All Sports Micro Fall 2016 All 𝛽( 0.044 0.052 0.047 0.034 0.038 
Uncorrected p-value 0.101 0.390 0.083 0.047 0.008 
Corrected p-value 0.086 0.222 0.036 0.026 0.002 
Cluster-robust p-value 0.130 0.359 0.079 0.077 0.013 
Cluster-bootstrap p-value 0.072 0.295 0.045 0.048 0.005 
Observations 204 110 314 462 776 
Students 34 22 56 66 122 
Assignments 6 5 11 7 18 
 
 
Results of our fixed effects regression model are included in table 2. As there is only one 
coefficient of interest (𝛽(), we present a total of five regression results in a single table: one for 
each section, one containing all sections and one grouping the two Sports Econ sections. Using 
White’s LM test (White 1980) and a Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro and Wilk 1965), we can reject the 
nulls of homoskedastic and normally distributed errors. This is true of all regressions throughout 
the manuscript. As a result, we report four p-values: using uncorrected errors, using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent errors (White 1980), using cluster-robust errors (Williams 2000) and 
using a cluster-bootstrap procedure that controls for both heteroskedasticity and normality issues. 
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The advantage of our bootstrap procedure is that it does not assume any underlying distribution. 
However, in small enough samples it may not be reasonable to assume that the sample is 
representative of the underlying population, in which case simply using a p-value that relies on 
asymptotic theory may be preferable. 
The cluster-bootstrapping procedure mentioned above randomly selects individual student 
IDs in the panel with replacement—not rows. Using the randomly selected student IDs, we select 
the corresponding set of rows. In some cases, these rows may be selected multiple times if the 
student was randomly selected more than once. This approach is appropriate for panel data where 
the errors may be correlated to the individuals (Künsch 1989). In all cases, we use 10,000 
replications in our cluster-bootstrap procedure. 
While the 𝛽( point estimates for the individual Sports Econ classes are insignificant at the 
5 percent level, using the cluster-bootstrap p-value, the pooled Sports Econ classes’ 𝛽(  is 
significant at 5 percent. Using any set of assumptions, the result is significant at the 10 percent 
level. Further, the Microeconomics class is significant at 5 percent using the cluster-bootstrap p-
value. Again, using any set of assumptions, the result is significant at the 10 percent level. Pooling 
the data, 𝛽( is significant at the 1.5 percent level using any set of assumptions, and is significant 
at the 1 percent level under the assumptions most accurately representing our data (evaluated by 
the cluster-bootstrap procedure). 
While table 2 represents the average impact of the nudge throughout a 16-week semester, 
an instructor adopting the procedure should be careful to send grade nudges early in the semester: 
there is some evidence that these treatments are more impactful than those sent late in the semester. 
Suppose a student receives a nudge early in the semester but then was assigned to the control group 
on the later assignments. The first nudge could have “primed” the student to be more aware of 
 11 
their grade throughout the semester (violating the assumptions of the fixed effects model). While 
our data contains only two first nudge assignments (as the first treatment in Microeconomics is 
unknown), we still wish to explore this idea. Consider the following alteration to our model: 
 𝑠"# = 𝛽& + 𝛽(3Nudge	First"# + 𝛽(Nudge"# + 𝜇" + 𝛾# + 𝜀"# (2) 
In this specification, First	Nudge"# takes the value one only if the nudge message is on the 
first treated assignment. Nudge"#  takes the value one on any treatment, including the first 
assignment. Running this specification on data from both Sports Econ classes and pooling all data 
reveals the results in table 3. This result shows limited statistical evidence that the first nudge 
might have a larger effect—we can reject the null with 90 percent confidence that the additional 
effect of the first nudge is zero using the Sports Econ data. When analyzing all data, we can reject 
the null with 95 percent confidence. 
 
TABLE 3: Estimated Impact of Nudge Treatment – Individual and Assignment Fixed Effects with Separate Nudge 
First Coefficient 
 Sports Classes All Classes 𝛽(3 0.107 0.106 
Uncorrected p-value 0.144 0.088 
Corrected p-value 0.062 0.048 
Cluster-robust p-value 0.126 0.093 
Cluster-bootstrap p-value 0.057 0.043 𝛽( 0.031 0.033 
Uncorrected p-value 0.277 0.029 
Corrected p-value 0.199 0.011 
Cluster-robust p-value 0.281 0.039 
Cluster-bootstrap p-value 0.214 0.021 
Observations 314 776 
Students 56 122 
Assignments 11 18 
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The larger impact of the first nudge could be due in part to the priming discussed above. 
However, there is an alternative explanation. The first nudge occurs early in the semester when 
students are the least concerned with their grade. Because a nudge is providing new information 
to students who are uninformed regarding the importance of homework assignments, the impact 
could be larger. Regardless of the reason, our results indicate that the first nudge sent early in the 
semester might be particularly important. 
An information nudge often produces a small behavioral change for a very low cost. Past 
projects by the Behavioural Insights Team have also produced a small effect size. For instance, 
using lotteries increased electoral registration rates by 3.3 percent (Service et al. 2014, 26) and 
using a direct Web link improved tax collection by 4 percent (Service et al. 2014, 13). Nonetheless, 
those projects still have value as the benefit outweighs the cost. 
If our point-estimates of the effect are valid, then implementing grade nudges in a course 
can improve homework scores by several percentage points. Presumably, this increases the 
knowledge accumulation of the student for a minimal cost: Once an instructor has become familiar 
with the application, it takes about three minutes to send subsequent messages to the entire class. 
CONCLUSION 
In most university classes, the student must visit the learning management system (LMS) to 
calculate the assignment’s impact on the overall grade. This is not easy, one of the common 
characteristics of a good nudge. By adding messaging to the bottom of each assignment, we have 
lowered the workload for the students, and made students’ grade information readily available. 
Through our randomized trial we have shown this grade nudge improves homework performance. 
It is notable that these gains are accomplished with a technique that requires no class time and is 
of minimal cost to the instructor when using the provided software. Our hope is that this article 
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will encourage instructors to provide grade information to their students in timelier and less costly 
ways than the traditional LMS. 
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NOTE 
1 The treatment message is simplified when achieving a higher grade is impossible or when a zero 
on the assignment will not result in a lower grade. For instance, a student with the highest possible 
grade in the course will not see the third sentence of the treatment message. Similarly, if a zero on 
the assignment will not result in a grade reduction, the fourth and fifth sentence will be omitted 
from the treatment. This selective transparency is designed to induce students to work harder in 
the course without causing unintended consequences for low-value assignments. 
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